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NUISANCE AND TRESPASS CLAIMS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: LEGISLATIVE
INACTION AND COMMON LAW CONFUSION
G. Nelson Smith, m*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, very few areas of law
have grown as quickly as environmental law. Unfortunately,
along with this growth has come a complex legal scheme and
a tremendous amount of confusion caused by legal statutory
interpretation and political wrangling.1 The net effect of this
confusing, complicated web of environmental laws has been
an increase in due diligence before the purchase of property.2
Another effect is that, in many cases, environmental laws
have served as the basis for destroying potential acquisi-
tions.3 Many people have complained that the current statu-
* B.A. 1983, Howard University (Magna Cum Laude); J.D. 1986, Univer-
sity of Virginia. Member, Virginia State Bar. Special thanks goes to my wife
Susan for all her love and support while I was writing this article.
1. G. Nelson Smith, III, Trashing the Town and Making It Pay: The Prob-
lem With The Municipal Liability Scheme Under CERCLA, 26 CoNN. L. REV.
585 (1994). One of the best examples of how political influence has created an
interpretive nightmare is outlined in CERCLA Section 119. 42 U.S.C. § 9619
(1980) (amended 1992). Under that statute, contractors who are negligent
when cleaning up an environmental site for the government are statutorily held
harmless from liability. However, under the same statute, if the contractor is
sued under a strict liability theory, then the contractor can still be held liable.
The result is that under CERCLA Section 119, a contractor can be held liable if
he complies with the law under strict liability, but if he admits to negligence
then he will be held harmless by the government. Such an absurd result is
indicative of how many of the environmental statutes currently operate.
2. See G. Nelson Smith, III, A Comparative Analysis of European and
American Environmental Laws: Their Effects on International Blue Chip Cor-
porate Mergers and Acquisitions, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 573
(1991).
3. Id. at 597-600. There, it was noted that:
[tiwo of the best known blue chip mergers and acquisitions that were
destroyed as a result of potential hazardous waste liabilities were the
660 million dollar proposed acquisition by the Sterling Group of Kop-
pers Chemical Company and the proposed 300 million dollar acquisi-
tion of Grow Group Inc. by PPG Industries.
Id. at 597.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tory scheme is unfair because it punishes law-abiding citi-
zens who violated no laws when they created the
contamination.4 Some of these individuals further argue that
the laws failed to adequately inform them of the wrongdoing
before 1980, and that Congress should modify such laws to
protect behavior that occurred before that date.'
Ironically, while the statutes themselves are relatively
new, they are based in the common law remedies of nuisance
and trespass. Since the early seventeenth century, courts
have recognized nuisance and trespass theories in environ-
mental matters.6 Nuisance and trespass claims in environ-
mental contamination cases are still used today, with many
such cases involving petroleum contamination. However, un-
like the environmental statutes of today that specifically in-
form the public of the liabilities resulting from environmental
contamination, the nuisance and trespass remedies remain
both nebulous and confusing. Moreover, nuisance and tres-
pass allegations are inconsistently interpreted by courts,
making the "failed to adequately inform" argument even
stronger than it would be with environmental statutes that
seek to retroactively punish polluters.
The purpose of this article is to show how the use of nui-
sance and trespass allegations in environmental cases has
failed to provide legal direction for potentially responsible
parties. This has created contradictions and absurd results.
Furthermore, this article seeks to establish that there is a
4. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical, 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 974 (C.D. Cal. 1993);
United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chemicals, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 419
(E.D. Pa. 1992); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991);
United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986).
5. Currently, Congress is considering a bill that would protect people from
liability that occurred before 1980, because they agree that people were not ade-
quately informed of the environmental dangers associated with their conduct.
This charge, primarily led by insurance carriers, is under the proposed amend-
ments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA). Moreover, many defense contractors have urged the gov-
ernment to absolve them from environmental liability that occurred before
1980, and have sought from the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) Council,
environmental cost principles that would make contractors immune from liabil-
ity if the contractors complied with existing laws when the site was operated.
See G. Nelson Smith, III, When Should Government Contractors Be Indemni-
fied?, 1 FED. FACILITIES ENVTL. J. 439 (1990).
6. See infra notes 14-23.
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need to statutorily define when a cause of action arises under
a nuisance or trespass claim in order to eliminate the poten-
tial for inconsistencies.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CONFUSION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
NUISANCE AND TRESPASS CLAIMS
The legal theories of nuisance and trespass were devel-
oped long before the birth of this country. In the latter part of
the twelfth century, King Henry II began several reforms
that greatly changed the course of English law.7 During his
reign, King Henry II unified and centralized English law by
establishing a permanent court of professional judges which
held court in various places throughout the country. The
King also initiated the use of "inquests" or "recognitions" and
the original writ as regular parts of the institution of justice.8
However, in order to bring an action under nuisance, the
King required the person bringing the suit to first obtain his
approval or the approval of the Justices.9
A. Nuisance
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was recog-
nized that a nuisance might be a public offense and therefore
remediable by indictment. Alternatively, the nuisance could
be private and remediable by a suit brought by the injured
party.10 Courts of equity used nuisance law to resolve con-
7. William A. McRae, Jr., The Development of Nuisance In the Early Com-
mon Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27 (1948).
8. Id. at 28 (citing WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 327
(5th ed. 1931); 1 FREDERICK POLLACK AND FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 138 (2d ed. 1911)).
9. McRae, Jr., supra note 7, at 28. Specifically, the author noted:
In the land law the encroachments of the king's court were rapid.
Since the violation of a man's seisin became the only forum for deter-
mining "who was last seised of this free tenement?" In the procedure
by original writ (that is, by royal writ) and inquest of the neighbors, no
question of right was determined; this was at first left to the lord's
court. But the transition to the grand assize, which determined the
question of right, maius jus, was inevitable, and it happened indeed
sometime during Henry's reign. It became axiomatic that "when a per-
son claims any freehold tenement, or a service... he cannot draw the
person holding it into a suit without the King's writ, or that of his
Justices."
Id.
10. Id. at 36 (citing 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
424 (5th ed. 1931) (footnotes omitted).
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flicts between property owners and strike a balance between
the competing interests of property owners in order to allow
the reasonable enjoyment of one's property.11 Many people
viewed these so called private nuisance actions as an early
method of town planning because towns sought to regulate
and control the arrival of new industries and occupations.'
2
Thus, during that period, many people also considered nui-
sance claims valuable because they created flexible remedies
and allowed the courts of equity to resolve disputes.
1 3
One of the earliest records of the use of nuisance in an
environmental matter is found in William Aldred's Case.
14
There, the court noted that "an action on the case lies for er-
ecting a hogstye so near the house of the plaintiff that the air
thereof was corrupted."' 5 The judge rejected the defendant's
argument "that the building of the house for the hogs was
necessary for the sustenance of man: and one ought not to
have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear the smell of
11. Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1124
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
12. Id. (citing E. RE, REMEDIES 431 (2d ed. 1987)).
13. Id. The Beatty court provided examples of how the courts of equity re-
solved such cases:
For example, in Sturges v. Bridgeman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1878), the utility
of a physician's consulting room was seriously affected by the vibration
caused by the neighboring confectioner's business that used large
pestles and mortars to pound "loaf sugar." Although both parties were
entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of their property, the
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the court decreed, "I will give [the defend-
ant] a reasonable time ... to alter the position of his mortars."
Beatty, 860 F.2d at 1124 (citing Sturges v. Bridgeman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 859
(1878)). The court provided another example of a compromising equity court:
In Hennessey v. Carmony, 25 A. 374 (N.J. Ch. 1892),... [t]he plaintiff
sought to enjoin the use of drying machines which "whiz and revolve
rapidly" causing noise and vibrations to plaintiff's property. Faced
with the task of balancing the conflicting interests of the parties, the
court granted the decree, but provided "that the defendant be re-
strained from so using his machines as to cause [plaintiff's] house to
vibrate...."
Beatty, 860 F.2d at 1124 (citing Hennessey v. Carmony, 25 A. 374, 381 (N.J. Ch.
1892)).
14. 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (KB. 1611).
15. Id.; see also Robert R. Lohrmann, Comment, The Environmental Law-
suit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories To Control Pollution, 16
WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1970).
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hogs." 1 6 In rejecting the argument, the reasoning was based,
in large part, on an environmental analogy:
And the building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but
if it be built so near a house, that when it burns the smoke
thereof enters into the house, so that none can dwell
there, an action lies for it. So if a man has a watercourse
running in a ditch from the river to his house, for his nec-
essary use; if a glover sets up a lime-pit for calve skins
and sheep skins so near the said watercourse that the cor-
ruption of the lime-pit has corrupted it, for which cause
his tenants leave the said house, an action on the case lies
for it ....
B. Trespass
Like nuisance, the law of trespass also has a lengthy his-
tory. As will be discussed later in more detail,18 a trespass is
a direct infringement upon another's right of possession' 9
and may be committed on or beneath the surface of the
earth.20 The arrival of trespass claims roughly coincided
with the establishment of nuisance law. From the time of
Henry III, it was sometimes used instead of nuisance.21 How-
ever, the use of trespass to resolve disputes declined. During
the reign of King Henry IV, trespass was not allowed for an
obstruction of a right of way.22 King Henry IV only allowed
such actions to be pursued under nuisance.23
Nevertheless, trespass theories continued to develop in
England. Under the common law of England, where individ-
ual rights were preserved by the Magna Carta, a violation of
those rights could be remedied by a traditional action for
damages.24 Violating the Magna Carta created an action in
16. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817; Lohrmann, supra note 15,
at 1106.
17. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
18. See infra part III.C.
19. Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 857 F. Supp. 838, 844
(D.N.M. 1994); Pacheco v. Martinez, 636 P.2d 308, 312 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1977).
20. Schwartzman, 857 F. Supp. at 844; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 158 (1977).
21. McRae, Jr., supra note 7, at 33-34.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id.
24. Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 924 (Md. 1984).
1995]
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trespass.25 One case that illustrates the importance of tres-
pass claims was Wilkes v. Wood. 26 In Wilkes, the Secretary of
State entered the plaintiff's home and seized papers upon an
unlawful general arrest warrant. Lord Pratt acknowledged
in his instructions to the jury that the official had trespassed
by acting "contrary to the fundamental principles of the con-
stitution."27 The court then held that the jury could consider
the illegal conduct in assessing damages.28
In 1840, the theory of nuisance expanded in England
where the courts began to apply nuisance in negligence cases,
further blurring the criminal and tort concepts of the writ.29
Finally, in 1866, in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher,"0 an Eng-
lish Court held that negligence was not required in nuisance
actions and that a strict liability standard could be applied.3 '
It is this strict liability standard that makes environmental
nuisance and trespass claims so attractive to plaintiffs today.
III. MODERN CONFUSION
A. The Petroleum Exclusion Under CERCLA
In the 1970's, Congress enacted several environmental
statutes which diminished the use of common law nuisance
and trespass. Acts such as the Clean Air Act,3 2 Clean Water
Act,33 Toxic Substances Control Act34 and Resource Conser-
25. Id.
26. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763), cited in Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 924.
27. Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 924 (quoting Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 507).
28. Id.
29. Kathleen Ann O'Neill, Note, Chemical Nuisance: Application of Public
Nuisance Theory as a Remedy for Environmental Law Violations, 26 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 51 (1992).
30. 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866).
31. Id. at 279 (holding that negligence is not required in nuisance actions).
In Rylands, the defendants constructed a reservoir. Upon filling the reservoir,
water broke through one of the vertical shafts leading to the plaintiff's aban-
doned coal mine, thereby causing the plaintiff to cease operations. The court
held the defendants strictly liable, despite the fact that the contractor who con-
structed the reservoir was negligent in his construction, reasoning:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own
purposes brings his on his land, and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he
does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequences of its escape.
Id. at 279.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
33. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
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vation and Recovery Act (RCRA)3 5 were all passed between
the years 1970 and 1977. These acts reduced the number of
claims involving common law air pollution, 6 common law
water pollution3 7 and common law hazardous waste claims,
particularly those claims involving petroleum contamina-
tion.3 In essence, these statutes eliminated many of the in-
consistencies created by the courts by statutorily outlining
when a lawsuit could be filed, who could be held liable, and
setting a defined statute of limitations period. 9
In 1980, the stability that appeared to be created as a
result of the passing of these statutes disappeared with the
passing of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 40 Broadly, CER-
CLA provides that the term hazardous substance "does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated a haz-
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988 and Supp. 1993).
36. See Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 515 F.2d 206
(8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975); Duquesne Light Co. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 481 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1973); Movement
Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D.C. Md.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 29
(4th Cir. 1973); In re Sports Complex in Hackensack Meadowlands, 300 A.2d
337 (N.J. 1973); Commonwealth Dept. of Envtl. Resources v. Pennsylvania
Power Co., 337 A.2d 823 (Pa. 1975).
37. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Ford Motor Co. v. United States Envt'l Protection Agency, 567 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1977); Marathon Oil v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); Quaries Petroleum Co., Inc. v. United States, 551
F.2d 1201 (Cl. Ct. 1977); CPC Intl. Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Republic Steel, 491 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Detrex Chemical Industries Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735 (D.C. Ohio 1975);
United States ex rel Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (C.D.
Il. 1973); United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 354 F. Supp. 173 (D. W. Va.
1973); United States Steel Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d
327 (111. App. Ct. 1977); Society for the Protection of N.H. Forest v. Site Evalua-
tion Comm., 337 A.2d 778 (N.H. 1975); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of Huntington,
339 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1972); State v. Republic Steel Corp. 38 Ohio Misc. 43
(Muni. 1973).
38. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act cases include U.S. Brewers
Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 600 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and
City of Philadelphia v. State, 376 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1977), prob. juris. noted, 434
U.S. 964 (1977); Toxic Substance Control Act cases include School Dist. of City
of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1981), and SED, Inc. v. City of
Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979 (C.D. Ohio 1981).
39. See supra notes 33-39.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988 and Supp. 1993).
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ardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
this paragraph ... .4 1 There is virtually no contemporane-
ous legislative history that directly relates to the scope of
CERCLA's petroleum exclusion. 2 This lack of information
surrounding CERCLA's enactment is because the final stat-
ute was a compromise among three competing bills.43 Con-
gress created further difficulty for litigants in petroleum con-
tamination cases under CERCLA by failing to define the
terms "petroleum" and "fraction." 4 4 It appears that such a
lack of definition has helped persuade plaintiffs to sue under
the theory of nuisance and trespass to avoid dismissals under
CERCLA.45
A plaintiff's inability to use CERCLA to litigate petro-
leum contamination cases has also had a profound effect at
the state level. For example, California's hazardous sub-
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988 and Supp. 1993); see KFC W., Inc. v.
Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995); Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic
Richfield, Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989); Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
818 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
42. Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield, Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 805
(9th Cir. 1989).
43. Id.; see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805
F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902-
05 (D.N.H. 1985); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 COLUM. J. EwrTL. L. 1-2 (1982). The three bills were H.R. 7020, 96th
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1980), H.R. 85, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979), and S. 1480, 96th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). CERCLA was passed after very limited debate under a
suspension of the rules. Of the three bills, only H.R. 85 addressed oil spills.
H.R. 85 was reported to the Senate but no further action on the bill was taken.
Wilshire Westwood Assoc., 881 F.2d at 806.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1989 and Supp. 1993), noted in Wilshire Westwood
Assoc., 881 F.2d at 803.
45. Wilshire Westwood Assoc., 881 F.2d at 803. A perfect example of the
confusion created by the lack of statutory guidance on the definition of petro-
leum and fractions is found on page 805 of the Wilshire Westwood case. There,
the court in discussing components of petroleum reasoned:
In further support of their construction of the plain meaning of the
petroleum exclusion, plaintiffs point out that the lead, benzene, ethyl-
benzene and toluene are hazardous substances covered by CERCLA if
released as part of chemical wastes..., that ethyl-benzene and xylene
are hazardous substances when constituents of coal tar.. ., and that
lead is a hazardous substance when it is a component of water-based
paint ....
Id. at 805 (citations omitted). The court rejected plaintiff's argument, holding
that "those same specifically listed substances would not be considered hazard-
ous if released as a result of leaking underground gasoline storage tanks ...
cannot be what Congress intended. Such an interpretation would render mean-
ingless the exception to the petroleum exclusion." Id.
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stance Act defines "hazardous substances" broadly to include
many dangerous chemicals listed in various state and federal
laws. 46 Under the Act, petroleum, including crude oil or any
fraction thereof which is not specifically listed or designated
as a hazardous substance, is excluded from the Act.47 In
Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,'8 a Federal District Court in
California was called upon to decide whether the petroleum
exclusion in the Act applied to refined petroleum products.' 9
The court noted that it was unaware of any published opinion
either by a higher California court or any other federal court
addressing the issue of whether the petroleum exclusion in
46. Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292, 293 (C.D. Cal.
1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25316 (West 1992 and Supp. 1995)
provides:
"Hazardous substance" means:
(a) Any substance designated pursuant to Section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Ti-
tle 33 of the United States Code.
(b) Any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance desig-
nated pursuant to Section 102 of the federal act (42 U.S.C. 9602).
(c) Any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to Section 6921 of Title 42 of the United States Code,
but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act has been suspended by act of Congress.
(d) Any toxic pollutant listed under Section 1317(a) of Title 33 of the
United States Code.
(e) Any hazardous air pollutant listed under Section 7412 of Title 42 of
the United States Code.
(f) Any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with re-
spect to which the Administrator of the United States Environment
Protection Agency has taken action pursuant to Section 2606 of Title
15 of the United States Code.
(g) Any hazardous waste or extremely hazardous waste as defined by
Sections 25117 and 25115, respectively, unless expressly excluded.
Id.
47. Ulvestad, 818 F. Supp. at 293; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25316
(West 1992 and Supp. 1995) provides:
"Hazardous substance" does not include:
(a) Petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance in
subdivisions (a) to (M, inclusive, of Section 25316, and natural gas, nat-
ural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas), or the ash pro-
duced by a resource recovery facility utilizing a municipal solid waste
stream.
(b) Nontoxic, nonflammable, noncorrosive stormwater run-off drained
from underground vaults, chambers, or manholes into gutters or
stormsewers.
Id.
48. Ulvestad, 818 F. Supp. at 292.
49. Id. at 293.
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the Hazardous Substance Act applied to refined petroleum.50
It also acknowledged that section 25317 of the Act expressly
states that petroleum, crude oil, and crude oil fractions are
excepted from the Act's reach, provided those fractions are
not listed as "hazardous substances."5 1 The district court
then reasoned that a crude oil fraction is a mixture or chemi-
cal compound derived from crude oil through "cracking" or a
distillation process, and that gasoline is universally known to
be a crude oil fraction.52 It then held that "because gasoline
is a crude oil fraction, but is not specifically listed as a haz-
ardous substance . . ., a plain reading of the statute reveals
gasoline is exempt from the Act."5 3 Equally important to the
holding is the court's recognition of the utter chaos caused by
the legislature's failure to define the term "petroleum:"
The Court realizes the concerns this ruling may raise.
Without clarifying action by the California Legislature,
today's holding could impede future efforts by the Depart-
ment to enforce clean-ups under the Act involving refined
petroleum spills. Nevertheless, the plain meaning of the
Act's petroleum exclusion is inescapable. In the absence
of controlling authority, this court is compelled to reach
this conclusion. It is for the California Legislature, not
the courts, to clarify the Act if the Legislature wants to
include refined petroleum. 54
It appears that because the California Hazardous Sub-
stance Act fails to define exactly what is encompassed within
the term petroleum, plaintiffs have avoided the issue by filing
their actions under nuisance and trespass. Ironically, the
same type of confusion expressed by the court in Ulvestad is
created by the current nuisance and trespass scheme.
Namely, what constitutes a nuisance or trespass is not de-
fined in the California Code, particularly as applied to envi-
ronmental matters. As a result, courts are compelled to hy-
pothesize as to the true meaning of an environmental
nuisance or trespass, and as to when a cause of action under
such theories accrues. Such lack of statutory guidance has
led to inconsistent interpretations, many times within the
50. Id. at 294.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal.
1993).
54. Id. at 297.
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same jurisdiction, causing both plaintiffs and defendants in
environmental nuisance and trespass litigation to question
the actual availability of such remedies.
B. The Ambiguity of What Constitutes a Nuisance
A nuisance is defined as "[alnything which is injurious to
health, indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction
to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfort-
able enjoyment of life or property .... "5 In some instances,
what may be considered a nuisance is poorly defined in a stat-
ute,56 while in some states nuisance appears to be a creature
of the courts.5 7 Under both scenarios, the result of failing to
establish what constitutes a nuisance has been a lack of spe-
cific guidelines upon which future litigants can rely.
The law of nuisance recognizes two conflicting rights."8
The first is that property owners may control their land and
use it to benefit their interests.5 9 The second is that the pub-
lic and neighboring land owners have a right to prevent an
unreasonable use of that land which substantially impairs
the peaceful use and enjoyment of their land.60 It is the "un-
reasonable use" aspect of nuisance that protects the rights of
adjacent property owners. 61 Unfortunately, as described be-
55. Graveley Ranch v. Scherping, 782 P.2d 371 (Mont. 1989) (citing MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-30-101 (1993)); see also KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518
(9th Cir. 1995); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Rossmoor Corp., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328
(Ct. App. 1995); Newhall Land and Farming v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
377 (Ct. App. 1993); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Ct.
App. 1993); Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); Frank v. Environmental Sanita-
tion Management, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Stevinson v. Def-
fenbaugh Indus., 870 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
56. See Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 832 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); see also CAL. Crv. CODE § 3479
(West 1992 and Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-30-101 (1993).
57. Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 857 F. Supp. 838, 844
(D.N.M. 1994); see also Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 774 (E.D. Va.
1994); Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876,
880 (Mo. 1985); Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., 870 S.W.2d 851, 851 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993); Ravan v. Greenville County, 434 S.E.2d 296, 306 (S.C. Ct. App.
1993).
58. Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., 870 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
59. Id.; see also Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, Inc., 687
S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Kueffer v. Brown, 879 S.W.2d 658, 662
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
60. Stevinson, 870 S.W.2d at 854.
61. Id.
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low, this attempt to balance rights, as opposed to establishing
a comprehensive statutory scheme, causes a great deal of con-
fusion for litigants.
There are two types of nuisances: public and private.
These are two distinct causes of action that relate to the un-
reasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land.2
Both of these causes of action will be discussed according to
their respective characteristics and requirements.
1. Private Nuisance
Historically, the law of private nuisance applied to con-
flicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses.6 3 A
private nuisance cause of action arises when the injury in-
flicted either diminishes the value of that property, continu-
ally interferes with the power or control of that property, or
causes a material disturbance or annoyance to the person in
the use or occupation of that property.64 Under a private nui-
sance theory, liability is imposed when there is an invasion of
the interest of the private land use and such interference is
(1) intentional and unreasonable, (2) negligent or reckless, or
(3) actionable under the rule governing liability for abnor-
mally dangerous conditions or activities.65 Whether this in-
vasion of the use and enjoyment of the property is a legal nui-
sance depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.66
Since private nuisance is a common law remedy, the
facts and circumstances become secondary to the jurisdiction
in which those facts and circumstances occurred. For exam-
ple, at least one jurisdiction has held that "a party is liable for
failing to abate a nuisance upon learning of it and having a
reasonable opportunity to abate it." 6 7 In California, "the stat-
62. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth, 640 A.2d 950, 957 (R.I.
1994).
63. Id.; see also Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 314
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mo-
bil Oil, 747 F. Supp. 93, 98 (D. Mass. 1990).
64. Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 773 (D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d
417 (4th Cir. 1995); Virginian Ry. Co. v. London, 76 S.E. 306 (Va. 1912).
65. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 819 F.
Supp. 1271, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
66. Adams, 851 F. Supp. at 773 (citing Bragg v. Ives, 140 S.E. 656 (Va.
1927)).
67. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 819 F. Supp. at 1279 (citing New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2nd Cir. 1985)).
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utory definition of nuisance appears to be broad enough to
encompass almost every conceivable type of interference with
the enjoyment of land or property."68 Similarly, several juris-
dictions have held that "under common law, a current owner
cannot assert a private nuisance claim against a prior owner
for contamination that occurred before the sale."69 On the
other hand, California courts have reasoned that "the Califor-
nia nuisance statutes have been construed, according to their
broad terms, to allow an owner of property to sue for damages
caused by nuisance created on the owner's property. Under
California law, it is not necessary that a nuisance have its
origin in neighboring property."7" In short, some jurisdic-
tions require a reasonable opportunity for the defendant to
abate the private nuisance while other jurisdictions have no
such requirement. Furthermore, some jurisdictions believe
that ownership of the property during the creation of the nui-
sance is important, while other jurisdictions deem ownership
irrelevant. Such inconsistencies only seek to serve the partic-
ular defendant or plaintiff in the respective jurisdiction. This
example of a lack of uniformity in interpreting what consti-
tutes a private nuisance only leads to protracted, and often
unnecessary, litigation.
2. Public Nuisance
Unfortunately, litigation under a public nuisance theory
also poses significant problems. A public nuisance is one
"which affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted
upon individuals may be unequal."71 Unlike a private nui-
68. Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 833 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994) (citing Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 162
Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1980), and People v. Stafford Packing Co., 227 P. 485
(Cal. 1924)).
69. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 740 A.2d 950, 957
(R.I. 1994); see also Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Wilson Auto Enter., Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101 (D.R.I. 1991); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil,
747 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1990); Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1989); Sheehy v. Uipton Industries, Inc., 507
N.E.2d 781 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
70. Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1993 and Supp. 1995); Mangini, 281 Cal.
Rptr. at 832.
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sance where there is an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, a public nuisance is an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the gen-
eral public.72 Thus, a public nuisance does not necessarily
create a private nuisance as well.73 As a result, not everyone
effected by a public nuisance possesses standing to recover
damages created by that nuisance.7 4 Only private individu-
als who suffer special damage distinct from damages to the
general public may pursue an action for public nuisance.75
To meet the "suffered special damages" requirement, a per-
son must establish that he or she suffered harm of a different
kind from that suffered by other members of the public.76 In
essence, successfully pursuing a public nuisance claim de-
pends not just on the facts of the case but on how effectively
the plaintiff pleads the case. If, for example, a person pleads
that he or she suffered pecuniary harm because of the con-
tamination of the property, then it is likely that such a claim
would fail as a public nuisance cause of action.77 Yet, if the
same plaintiff, under the same fact scenario, alleged that he
or she suffered special damages as a result of the defendant's
interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the
groundwater at the site or his or her right to pure water, then
that plaintiff is likely to have effectively pleaded a cause of
action under public nuisance.78
Similarly, if a plaintiff alleges that an environmental
nuisance is an absolute public nuisance then the plaintiff
must establish that the creation of the nuisance was inten-
tional.79 On the other hand, if there is no allegation of an
absolute public nuisance, then there is no obligation to estab-
72. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 955; see also Citizens for Pres-
ervation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53 (R.I. 1980).
73. Newhall Land and Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377,
381 (Ct. App. 1993).
74. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 957.
75. Id.; see also Iafrate v. Ramsden, 190 A.2d 473 (R.I. 1963); Radigan v.
W.J. Halloran Co., 196 A.2d 160 (R.I. 1963).
76. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 955; see also Capogeannis v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Ct. App. 1993); Institoris v. City of Los
Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418 (Ct. App. 1989).
77. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 956; see also Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir. 1985).
78. Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., 640 A.2d at 956; see also Mayor of Rocka-
way v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039 (D.N.J. 1993).
79. Westchester County v. Town of Greenwich, 870 F. Supp. 496, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Connecticut v. Trippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton,
[Vol. 36
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
lish that defendants acted intentionally.80 Therefore, it be-
comes essential that any plaintiff who seeks to pursue a claim
under public nuisance carefully plead his or her case to avoid
a dismissal.
To require someone to carefully plead a public nuisance
argument or else face dismissal seems to completely ignore
the purpose of allowing a person to bring an environmental
claim under a public nuisance theory. The purpose of requir-
ing one to remedy a public nuisance is to protect the health
and welfare of the citizens."' Yet, in these examples, protect-
ing the health and safety of the citizens takes a back seat to
the careful articulation of lawyers. Such a requirement
seems to contradict the very reason for having environmental
laws, and further establishes why changing the current envi-
ronmental nuisance laws to a uniform format is essential.
C. The Ambiguity of What Constitutes Environmental
Trespass
Most of the environmental claims filed under common
law theories combine general nuisance and trespass theo-
ries.2 Much of the confusion created under these two theo-
ries has been a result of interpreting the theories as virtually
527 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1987); County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 745 F.
Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
80. Westchester County, 870 F. Supp. at 501.
81. See Newhall Land and Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
377, 381 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Pollution of water constitutes a public nuisance ....
In fact, water pollution occurring as a result of treatment or discharge of wastes
in violation of Water Code section 13000, et seq. is a public nuisance per se.")
(citations omitted).
82. See Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33 (D. Me. 1994);
Mortkowitz v. Texaco Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Nissan Motor
Corp. v. Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 544 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Md.
1982); KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Ct. App. 1994); Newhall
Land and Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Ct. App. 1993);
Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Ct. App. 1993); Mangini v.
Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted, 883
P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994).
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identical.8 3 There are significant differences between the the-
ories of nuisance and trespass.84
While environmental trespass and nuisance often occur
concurrently, the two torts are distinct.8 5 A claim of trespass
contemplates actual physical entry or invasion, whereas nui-
sance liability arises merely by virtue of an activity which
falls short of tangible, concrete invasion but interferes with
the use and enjoyment of land.8 6 In essence, the definition of
trespass in environmental matters is narrower than the defi-
nition of nuisance8 7 and nuisance covers a much broader
range of property rights, including the use and enjoyment of
the property.8 8 In other words, the difference between tres-
pass and nuisance is that a trespass in environmental mat-
ters is any intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interest in
83. See Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 833 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994) ("California cases have also recog-
nized that invasions of plaintiff's property, otherwise amounting to a trespass,
may also constitute a nuisance under the statutes."). In Mangini the court also
noted:
There may... be some overlapping of the causes of action for trespass
and private nuisance. An invasion of the possession of land normally
involves some degree of interference with its use and enjoyment and
this is true particularly when some harm is inflicted upon the land it-
self. The cause of action for trespass has traditionally included liabil-
ity for incidental harms of this nature. If the interference with the use
and enjoyment of the land is a significant one, sufficient in itself to
amount to a private nuisance, the fact that it arises out of or is accom-
panied by a trespass will not prevent recovery for the nuisance, and
the action may be maintained upon either basis as the plaintiff elects
or both. Thus the flooding of the plaintiff's land, which is a trespass, is
also a nuisance if it is repeated or of long duration; and when the de-
fendant's dog howls under the plaintiff's window night after night and
deprives him of sleep, there is a nuisance whether the dog is outside
the plaintiff's land or has entered upon it, and the defendant's negli-
gence in looking after the dog would make him liable either for tres-
pass if there was an entry or for nuisance whether there was entry or
not. The two actions, trespass and private nuisance, are thus not en-
tirely exclusive or inconsistent, and in a proper case in which the ele-
ments of both actions are fully present, the plaintiff may have his
choice of one or the other, or may proceed upon both.
Id. at n.6.
84. Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 857 F. Supp. 838, 844
(D.N.M. 1994).
85. Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 772 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1994), aff'd,
51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995).
86. Schwartzman, Inc., 857 F. Supp. at 844.
87. Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 799 (Ct. App.
1993).
88. Adams, 851 F. Supp. at 773 n.4.
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the exclusive possession of his property, while nuisance is a
substantial interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoy-
ment.8 9 Confusion arises here since many plaintiffs assume
that because they may have an environmental claim under
nuisance, it follows that they also have a claim under a tres-
pass theory as well. Such is not always the case. For exam-
ple, courts have held that under a trespass theory, a person
cannot be found liable if the act in question was "an uninten-
tional non-negligent entry, even if harm is done."90 At a bare
minimum, plaintiffs must at least establish that the defend-
ant's negligence caused the waste to enter plaintiff's land.91
Moreover, plaintiffs cannot prevail in a trespass claim when
the only damage that the plaintiff suffers is a stigma.92
Plaintiffs also cannot prevail where groundwater wells are
not contaminated. 93 One court has even held that a person
cannot trespass on his own land.94 By contrast, if properly
plead under nuisance, a plaintiff can recover against a party
who unintentionally deposited waste on the plaintiff's prop-
erty.95 Similarly, courts have also held that even if a person
has not suffered any actual damage, he or she may still re-
cover under a public nuisance theory.96 There is little differ-
89. Ravan v. Greenville County, 434 S.E.2d 296, 306 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(citing WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 2.13
(1977)).
90. Nissan Motor Corp. v. Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1104, 1116 (D. Md. 1982).
91. Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33, 48 (D. Me. 1994)
(citing Hayes v. Bushey, 196 A.2d 823, 826 (Me. 1964)).
92. Adams, 851 F. Supp. at 773.
93. Williams v. Allied Automotive Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D.
Ohio 1988).
94. Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 799 (Ct. App.
1993).
95. Nissan Motor Corp. v. Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1104, 1116-17 (D. Md. 1982). There the court rejected the plaintiff's
cases which allowed recovery for smoke damage. Id. The court noted that in
those cases "it would appear that the law of nuisance was applied rather than
the law of trespass." Id. at 1117.
96. Koll-Irvine Ctr. v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664,668 (Ct. App.
1994) ("No invasion of an interest in land is required for [a public nuisance]
action, and the public entity need not show unique damages."); cf Adams, 851
F. Supp. at 774, where the court reasoned:
Apart from the stigma damage, plaintiffs have alleged that the
remediation efforts have interfered with community functions and cre-
ated other disturbances. The court finds that although these allega-
tions are properly pled, they allege only temporary disturbances, while
the damages sought reflect permanent injuries. [Tihe general rule in
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ence as to what damages may be recovered under either a
nuisance or trespass claim 97 and, generally, there is virtually
no difference between the two for statute of limitation pur-
poses.98 Due to the numerous obstacles faced when pleading
a trespass claim, courts have made the trespass claim obso-
lete and virtually useless when such claims could be encom-
passed by a nuisance claim. This result is similar to the sta-
tus possessed by the trespass theory under early English
common law.
Nevertheless, most plaintiffs feel compelled to allege a
trespass theory to preserve a cause of action. This is a perfect
example of how the lack of statutory distinction between tres-
pass and nuisance has created much of the confusion litigants
confront when pursuing common law environmental claims.
such circumstances is plaintiff may bring repeated actions to recover
for nuisance so long as the nuisance continues. However, a defendant
will not be made to pay for a continuous nuisance that will some time
abate.
Id. (citing Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Corp. v. Richardson, 88 S.E. 317 (Va.
1916) and Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 87 S.E. 558 (Va. 1915)). The key here
is that the Koll-Irvine Center court, through its holding, has implicitly stated
that damages can be recovered under nuisance for stigma alone. Koll-Irvine
Ctr., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 668.
97. One legal commentator has argued, "[wihile trespass and nuisance will
often appear to overlap, there are certain advantages to the suit in trespass.
Since the law infers some damage from every unauthorized invasion of an-
other's land, trespass requires no proof of actual injury." See Robert R.
Lohrman, Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and
Evolving Theories To Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1117 (1970).
However, this premise is of little significance in environmental cases, since
most environmental cases, particularly those that involve groundwater and soil
contamination, very seldom have only nominal damages.
98. See Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800, where the court, in discussing
the statute of limitations under both nuisance and trespass, reasoned:
The answer depends on long-established distinctions between perma-
nent and continuing nuisance and trespasses. The analysis is essen-
tially the same for trespass as it is for nuisance. For convenience of
statement and citation we shall for the most part refer only to nui-
sance, but our conclusions apply as well to the Capogeannises' trespass
theory against Tri-Pallet.
Id. Similarly, in Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 842 (Ct.
App. 1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994), the court stated that, "the
application of the statute of limitations for trespass has been the same as for
nuisance and has depended on whether the trespass is continuing or perma-
nent." Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 842. However, compare Lohrmann, supra
note 97, at 1117 n.180, where the author notes that Oregon has a six year stat-
ute of limitations for trespass claims and a two year statute of limitations for
nuisance actions.
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D. The Problem of Accrual
1. The Establishment of Continuing and Permanent
Nuisance and Trespass Claims for Statute of
Limitations Purposes
Determining what causes of action must be plead in envi-
ronmental nuisance and trespass cases is both complicated
and confusing. However, it is far more complicated to deter-
mine when those causes of action arise. Courts have at-
tempted to address the problem of determining when a cause
of action exists and the time frame in which potential plain-
tiffs have to file such a cause of action. One must divide the
nuisance and trespass claims into two separate categories:
continuing nuisance and trespass claims, and permanent nui-
sance and trespass claims.99 Whether a nuisance is tempo-
rary or permanent is frequently difficult to determine.100 In
reality, the primary purpose of determining whether a nui-
sance or trespass is continuing or permanent is to establish
the outcome of a particular case or the legal effects of certain
defenses, such as the statute of limitations. 10 1 Consequently,
determining when a nuisance or trespass commences or is
tolled for statute of limitations purposes is also a difficult
issue. 102
A nuisance or trespass is continuing if it is capable of be-
ing abated. 103 Historically, however, there was a presump-
tion that all nuisances and trespasses were not continuing
and the remedy for a continuing nuisance or trespass was
either a suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for
damages as new injuries occurred. 104 Yet, situations devel-
oped where injunctive relief was not appropriate or where
successive actions were undesirable to defendant and plain-
99. See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866,
869 (Cal. 1985); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 800 (Ct.
App. 1993); Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); Spar v. Pacific Bell, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 480, 480 (Ct. App. 1991).
100. Graveley Ranch v. Scherping, 782 P.2d 371, 373 (Mont. 1989).
101. Stevinson, 870 S.W.2d at 855; Graveley Ranch, 782 P.2d at 373.
102. Sachs v. Exxon Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237, 237 (Ct. App. 1992); see also
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 844 (Ct. App. 1991), rev.
granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994).
103. KFC W., Ina v. Meghrig, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 676, 685 (Ct. App. 1994).
104. Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Ct. App.
1993); see also Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1952).
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tiff alike.1 0 5 In such situations, it was recognized that some
types of nuisance or trespass should be considered perma-
nent, and in those cases recovery of past and anticipated fu-
ture damages would be allowed in one action.
10 6
Once again, there is no single, all inclusive rule to deter-
mine whether an environmental nuisance or trespass is con-
tinuing or permanent, and each case must be decided on its
specific facts.10 7 However, when there is doubt as to the per-
manency of the injury caused by the environmental nuisance
or trespass, courts are inclined to favor the right of plaintiffs
to bring successive actions. 10 8 Furthermore, courts are also
inclined to allow plaintiffs to elect whether they are proceed-
ing under a continuing or permanent nuisance theory. 0 9
These options are made available to plaintiffs to avoid giving
the defendant, because of his wrongful act, the right to con-
tinue the wrong; a wrong courts deem equivalent to an ease-
ment."10 This doctrine of election is designed to facilitate a
just and equitable recovery."'
Proving when claims for environmental nuisance or tres-
pass are time barred depends upon when these causes of ac-
tion accrue." 2 The question of when a cause of action accrues
in such a case is generally a mixed question of law and
fact. 3 The traditional rule in tort matters is that the appli-
cable limitation period begins to run "upon the occurrence of
the last element essential to the cause of action.""14 In the
case of permanent environmental nuisance or trespass ac-
tions, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of
105. Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
106. Id.
107. Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1125
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
108. Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Ct. App. 1988); see
also Kafka v. Bozio, 218 P. 743, 753 (Cal. 1923).
109. Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 839 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994) (citing Baker v. Burbank-Glen-
dale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 871 (Cal. 1985); Spaulding v. Cam-
eron, 239 P.2d 625, 628 (Cal. 1952)).
110. Field-Escandon, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 52; Kafka, 218 P. at 755-56.
111. Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 866
(Cal. 1985).
112. Mortkowitz v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
see also Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715 (Ct. App. 1980).
113. Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715 (Ct. App. 1980).
114. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1237; CAMSI TV v. Hunter Technology
Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84 (Ct. App. 1991).
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the act causing immediate and permanent injury. 115 Where
the permanent injury is the result of a series of acts by the
defendant, the general rule is that the statute of limitations
runs from the date of the last act. 116 Moreover, for purposes
of the statute of limitations, the harm implicit in a tortious
injury is the harm to the property itself.1 1 7
Again, here is where much of the confusion lies. Specifi-
cally, with a continuing nuisance or trespass environmental
claim "every repetition of the continuing nuisance is a sepa-
rate wrong subject to a separate litigation period for which
the person injured may bring successive actions until the nui-
sance is abated, even though an action based on the original
wrong may be barred."1 8 In analyzing when an action ac-
crues as a result of the last act causing injury, it is apparent
that the traditional rules for tort cases are not cohesive with
environmental common law claims. When there is perma-
nent groundwater contamination, for example, the ground-
water migrates causing a new permanent injury; namely new
contamination of groundwater. As such, it could be argued
that each movement of the groundwater contamination is a
separate wrong subject to a separate limitation period.11
Such is not the case as courts have reasoned that "[lfor a per-
manent nuisance, the period of limitations runs immediately
upon the creation of the permanent nuisance and bars all
claims of damage, present and future, after lapse of the statu-
tory period."120
In essence, when discussing the statute of limitations in
permanent nuisance and trespass cases versus continuing
nuisance and trespass cases, the primary emphasis has been
on when the plaintiff knew of should have known about the
contamination and what damages can be recovered under
what theory, not on when the actual injury occurred. 12'
115. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1237; CAMSI IV, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
116. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1237.
117. Id.
118. Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Ct. App.
1993) (quoting Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-27 (Cal. 1945).
119. Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
120. Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 870 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) (citing Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage Dist., 602 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980)).
121. Id.; see also Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d
1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Mortkowitz v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1232, 1237
(N.D. Cal. 1994); Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d
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While logic supports the courts' distinction between the
knowledge requirement and when the actual injury occurred,
the language used by the courts does not support or readily
establish such a distinction. The ambiguity of the language
should not be blamed upon the courts.
Instead, much of the blame lies with the legislature. The
legislature has failed to compel plaintiffs to abandon common
law environmental nuisance and trespass actions for many of
the environmental laws in place today. This has allowed, and
in some instances forced, plaintiffs to bring claims under com-
mon law theories which are inappropriate for the result
sought.
2. Statute of Limitations and Burden of Proof
By failing to address the actual injury argument appro-
priately, courts have also failed to consistently address the
next logical issue; namely, who has the burden of proof to es-
tablish damages when parts of the injury occurred within the
statute of limitations and parts of the injuries occurred
outside of the statutory period. Some courts have held that
when parts of an environmental injury occur within the ap-
propriate statute of limitations period and other parts occur
outside the statute of limitations, the burden is on the plain-
tiff to establish what damages occurred within such period. 122
The reason courts place the burden on the plaintiff is to pre-
vent the plaintiff from postponing the bringing of the ac-
tion.123 Whether part of the claim is based on permanent
nuisance and the other parts are brought under a continuing
nuisance theory, 124 or whether the plaintiff is only seeking
injunctive relief,125 the burden remains with the plaintiff.
On the other hand, many courts have also held that the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and that the
866, 872 (Cal. 1985); Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800; CAMSI IV v. Hunter
Technology Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 80, 85 (Ct. App. 1991); Mangini v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837-39 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted, 883
P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52-53 (Ct.
App. 1988).
122. Parro v. Fifteen Oil Co., 26 So.2d 30, 33 (La. Ct. App. 1946) (citing
Howell v. City of Dothan, 174 So. 624, 628 (Ala. 1937)).
123. Parro, 26 So.2d at 33.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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burden of proof rests with the party pleading it.' 26 Thus,
where part of the plaintiff's case is barred and the other is
not, the defendant, not the plaintiff, is required to prove
which part falls specifically within the protection of the stat-
ute. 127 The reasoning, like the conclusion, differs from the
reasoning used to justify why the plaintiff should bear the
burden of proof by other courts. Here, the courts have held
that "the obligation to segregate the damage should fall upon
the wrongdoer and not upon the person harmed."' 28 Finally,
to bring the confusion of the issue closer to home, California
has not developed a firm stand on this issue. The implication,
however, is that the plaintiff has the burden of proof. 129 Nev-
ertheless, both plaintiffs and defendants are again hindered
by the lack of statutory guidance under the common environ-
mental nuisance and trespass law.
3. Discovery Rule
Finally, in regards to the knowledge of the plaintiff at the
time the contamination was created, California courts have
attempted to bring equity into the equation by developing the
so-called discovery rule. The discovery rule postpones the
commencement of the limitations period until the plaintiff
discovers, or should have discovered, all of the facts essential
to the cause of action.130 Specifically, commencement of the
limitations period is postponed until either the plaintiff actu-
ally discovers the injury and its negligent cause or could have
discovered the injury and cause through the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence;1 1 subjective suspicion is not required. 13 2
126. Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 704 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985); see also Sanders v. Merchants' State Bank, 182 N.E. 897, 903 (I1. 1932);
Golden v. Lerch Bros., 281 N.W. 249, 253 (Minn. 1938); Girson v. Girson, 114
P.2d 274, 275 (Mont. 1941); Block v. Briendel, 174 N.Y.S.2d 389 (App. Div.
1958); Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 466 P.2d 605, 617-18 (Or. 1970); Buck
v. Newberry, 47 S.E. 889, 890 (W. Va. 1904).
127. Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 704 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985).
128. Id. at 1262 (citing Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 466 P.2d 605, 617-
18 (Or. 1970)).
129. See O'Hair v. California Prune & Apricot Growers' Ass'n, 20 P.2d 375
(Ct. App. 1933); Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Ct.
App.) (en banc), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Mangini Il].
130. Mortkowitz v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1232, 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 80, 85 (Ct. App. 1991).
131. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1238.
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Establishing when the plaintiff should have discovered
the contamination is as murky as the contamination itself.
The discovery rule is designed to eliminate the harshness of
the traditional application of the limitations period where it
would be "manifestly unjust to deprive a plaintiff of a cause of
action before he is aware that he has been injured."133 The
rule is premised upon the idea that statutes of limitations are
intended to run against those individuals that fail to exercise
reasonable care in protection of their rights.1 3 4  Conse-
quently, the limitations should not be interpreted as a bar to
a victim of wrongful conduct asserting a cause of action
before the person could reasonably be expected to discover its
existence.13 5  Instead, the discovery rule in California is
viewed as a protector of the "blamelessly ignorant."1 36 Yet,
seldom is the discovery rule effectively plead by a plaintiff.
137
A plaintiff who intends to rely upon the discovery rule
must first plead specific facts which show the time and man-
ner of discovery and the inability to have made an earlier dis-
covery despite reasonable diligence.13 8 California courts see
this pleading requirement as a procedural safeguard against
lengthy litigation on the issue of accrual.'3 9 Next, if the
plaintiff becomes aware of facts which would make a reason-
ably prudent person suspicious, he or she has a duty to inves-
tigate further and is charged with knowledge of matters
which would have been revealed in such an investigation. 14
0
The key here is that the plaintiff is not required to have ac-
tual knowledge.' 4 1 Thus, for example, when statewide agen-
cies order an investigation of the groundwater and soil be-
cause contamination has been discovered, a plaintiff is
132. Id.; Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 843 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994).
133. Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 843; see also Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at
1238; Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711, 717 (Ct. App. 1980).
134. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1238; CAMSI IV, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
135. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1238.
136. Id. (quoting Leaf, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 843).
137. See Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1238; CAMSI V, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 86;
Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
138. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1238; CAMSI V, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
139. Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 843; April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 421, 432-33 (Ct. App. 1983).
140. Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 843; see also Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at
1238; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 927 (Cal. 1988); Miller v. Bechtel
Corp., 663 P.2d 177, 182 (Cal. 1983).
141. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1239.
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deemed to have sufficient knowledge for statute of limitations
purposes. 142 Furthermore, California courts have held that
plaintiffs possess the requisite knowledge to initiate the run-
ning of the statute of limitations when plaintiffs fail to com-
ply with environmental statutory requirements, regardless of
their knowledge of the environmental statute's existence.' 4 3
The statute also runs when plaintiffs become aware that the
defendant had engaged in activities of a potentially hazard-
ous nature,14 4 such as operating a gasoline station. 45 In
summary, it appears that the discovery rule is nothing more
than form, because it really offers no protection to plaintiffs
who seek to establish that they acted in good faith in not fil-
ing within the allotted time period.
E. The Confusion in the Permanent/Continuing Nuisance
and Trespass Distinction
Determining what damages are to be recovered in envi-
ronmental nuisance and trespass claims is also very compli-
cated and confusing. Much of the confusion and complica-
tions revolve around whether the nuisance or trespass
damage is deemed to be continuing or permanent.
1 46
Whether the damage caused by environmental contamination
is permanent or continuing is generally a question of fact
based upon the extent and nature of the contamination.
47
Consequently, plaintiffs are compelled to establish the nature
and extent of the damage suffered since continuing nuisance
and trespass claims have different statute of limitations, dif-
ferent defenses, different theories of recovery and ultimately
142. CAMSI V, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 86-87.
143. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
144. Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 844 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994) (citing Fair v. Stevenot, 29 Cal.
486, 488-89 (1866); American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Feller, 131 Cal. Rptr. 270,
277 (Ct. App. 1976)).
145. Mortkowitz, 842 F. Supp. at 1240.
146. When assessing damages, courts generally treat nuisance and trespass
claims similarly, since the emphasis is on whether the nuisance or trespass is
permanent or continuing, not on what type of cause of action exists. See
Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 1993);
Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
147. Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841 (Ct. App.
1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); see also Mangini II, 31 Cal. Rptr.
2d 696, 703 (Ct. App.), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994).
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different remedies from permanent nuisance and trespass
claims.148
Unfortunately, without any sort of statutory guidance,
courts have been unable to fully articulate exactly what infor-
mation must be provided by a plaintiff to meet his legal bur-
den. Many times, courts are fortunate enough to have the
regulators determine whether contamination can be
abated.149 Yet, in some instances, courts do not have this lux-
ury and are compelled to make difficult decisions regarding
the status of the contamination. 150 It is under these circum-
stances that many courts, without statutory guidance, are
forced to hypothesize how much evidence they believe is suffi-
cient to present the case to the jury. Requiring the courts to
make such technical decisions for purposes of assessing dam-
ages extends many courts beyond their expertise and further
establishes why a uniform statutory standard for environ-
mental nuisance and trespass claims needs to be established.
In California, under a continuing nuisance claim, a per-
son may bring successive actions and seek damages against
those responsible for the continuing nuisance until the nui-
sance is abated. 15 1 While what constitutes "damages" is not
artfully defined, the general implication is that damages,
under a continuing nuisance claim, "should be confined to
that period of time reasonably necessary to 'repair' the busi-
ness, i.e. to get it back into operation at its former
capacity."1 5 2
148. Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., 870 S.W.2d 850, 855 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
149. See Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 805 (Ct. App.
1993). The court held:
We are not persuaded by the Spences' essentially semantic argument
that because it does not appear the contamination can ever be wholly
removed the nuisance must be deemed permanent. We are satisfied to
presume that cleanup standards set by responsible public agencies suf-
ficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be done to abate
contamination in particular cases. As judges we will not presume to
insist upon absolutes these agencies do not require.
Id.
150. Mangini II, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Ct. App.), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387
(Cal. 1994). The court was forced to review the issues of abatability, and what
the evidence showed regarding abatability. Id.
151. See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866,
871 (Cal. 1985); Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. at
800-02.
152. Blake v. E. Thompson Petroleum Repair Co., Inc., 216 Cal. Rptr. 568,
574 (Ct. App. 1985).
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In other words, plaintiffs are only entitled to recover the
damages incurred during the period of interruption. 151 Such
damages include lost business profits,1 5 1 injunctive relief,1 55
and the depreciation of the rental or usable value during the
injury.1 5 6
The law in California is relatively clear with respect to
continuing environmental nuisance and trespass claims
under the above mentioned scenarios. However, there are
many aspects of the law that remain confusing. For example,
under a private continuing nuisance claim, damages for emo-
tional distress may be awarded. 15 7 However, the claim must
be based upon injuries to the person that are special to him
and different to the harm suffered by the general public.158
In short, the availability of an emotional distress claim in a
continuing environmental nuisance or trespass case is quite
limited.
Cassinos v. Union Oil Company of California1 59 is an ex-
ample of how California courts have failed to adequately ar-
ticulate what damages are recoverable in a continuing nui-
sance case. In Cassinos, the court held "deterioration in
market value of property is the proper measure for continu-
ing nuisance which cannot be abated. Such measures of dam-
ages are proper even if the actual injury to the property is
nominal."1 60  However, the phrase "continuing nuisance
which cannot be abated" is a contradiction. According to the
definition previously cited, 161 a continuing nuisance is capa-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 838; Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
156. See FDIC v. Jackson-Shaw Partners No. 46, 850 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1952); Quails v. Smyth, 307
P.2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Spaulding V. Cameron, 274 P.2d 177 (Cal. Ct. App.
1954); Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 233 P.2d 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951);
Ingram v. City of Gridley, 224 P.2d 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Alexander v. Ar-
kansas City, 396 P.2d 311 (Kan. 1964).
157. Koll-Irvine Center v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 668 (Ct.
App. 1994); see also Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 262 Cal. Rptr. 754, 766 (Ct.
App. 1989); Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (Ct. App.
1989); Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 706 (Ct. App. 1986).
158. Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (Ct.
App. 1971)).
159. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Ct. App. 1993).
160. Id. at 583.
161. See discussion supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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ble of abatement. Thus, the definition implies that the dam-
age must be permanent. Yet, the court applied this holding
to a continuing nuisance claim, implying that so long as the
property will be restored to its previous value when the nui-
sance is removed, plaintiffs are entitled to recover the losses
incurred during the period in which the nuisance occupied
the property. Nevertheless, the holding is unclear, further
clouding an already mind-boggling interpretation of what
damages are recoverable in a continuing environmental nui-
sance and trespass case.
Attempting to recover damages in a permanent environ-
mental nuisance and trespass case is also complicated. In a
permanent environmental nuisance or trespass case, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover permanent damages, including
the diminution in property value. 162 However, two critical
problems develop when one pursues permanent damages in
an environmental nuisance and trespass case. First, courts
generally treat environmental nuisances and trespasses as
continuing, not permanent. As noted by the court in
Capogeannis:
Over the years the courts, presumably mindful of the gen-
esis of permanent nuisance as a practical exception to a
preferred rule, have maintained a preference for finding a
continuing nuisance, both to protect the plaintiff from
"contingencies" such as unforeseen injury and the statute
of limitations itself and to encourage abatement of
nuisances. 163
Therefore, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
when the damages are permanent. Otherwise, the case pro-
ceeds under a continuing nuisance theory. This approach
created a problem for courts since the courts never articu-
lated who had the burden of establishing whether the dam-
ages were indeed permanent or continuing. Recently, one
court held that the burden belongs to the plaintiff.16 1 While
162. Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Ct. App.
1993); see also Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 774 (E.D. Va. 1994),
aff'd, 51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995); Mangini 11, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 708 (Ct.
App.), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); Ravan v. Greenville County, 434
S.E.2d 296, 307 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
163. Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281
Cal. Rptr. 827, 838 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994).
164. Mangini 11, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696.
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it was a California Supreme Court ruling,16 5 it is highly un-
likely that many new plaintiffs or defendants will see the de-
cision as solving many of the problems created by classifying
an environmental nuisance claim as permanent or
continuing.
The second problem that courts have inconsistently ad-
dressed is whether permanent damages can be recovered
under a continuing nuisance theory. In California, as well as
most other jurisdictions, courts have held that permanent
damages cannot be recovered under a continuing nuisance
theory. 166 Yet, the rule that permanent damages cannot be
recovered under a continuing nuisance claim is not uniform,
as several courts have held that recovery of such damages are
possible. 167 For courts to end up on the opposite side on such
an important issue indicates that plaintiffs and defendants
could be playing a dangerous game if they elect to seek per-
manent damages in a continuing nuisance or trespass case.
More importantly, such differing interpretations under the
same basic fact scenario show the need for a uniform and con-
sistent statutory scheme governing environmental nuisance
and trespass claims.
IV. ESTABLISHING UNIFORM STANDARDS WOULD Do LITTLE
TO DISRUPT THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
OF PLAINTIFFS
Recent case law recognizes that common law nuisance
and trespass claims in environmental matters are secondary
claims when such claims are combined with other statutory
165. By the time of this publication, the Supreme Court will have probably
ruled in the Mangini case, which they agreed to hear on Oct. 27, 1994. Mangini
v. Aerojet-General Corp., 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994).
166. Mangini 11, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707-08; see also Adams v. Star Enter.,
851 F. Supp. 770, 773 (E.D. Va. 1994); Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 629
(Cal. 1952); Spar v. Pacific Bell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 483-84 (Ct. App. 1991);
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 839-40 (Ct. App. 1991),
rev. granted, 883 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1994); Ploney v. Reser, 3 Cal. Rptr. 551 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1960); Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., 870 S.W.2d 851, 855-
56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Graveley Ranch v. Scherping, 782 P.2d 371, 375 (Mont.
1989).
167. Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1125-
26 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Signal Mountain Portland Cement Co. v. Brown,
141 F.2d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 1944); Hartzler v. Town of Kalona, 218 N.W.2d 608,
610 (Iowa 1974).
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claims.168 For example, in the case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Superior Court,1 69 the court considered "whether a property
owner who might otherwise be entitled to indemnification for
abating a 'continuing nuisance' is barred by the statute of
limitations applicable to latent defects." 170 The court ac-
knowledged that generally a continuing nuisance claim "may
be brought at any time before the nuisance or trespass has
been discontinued or abated or within three years after-
ward."171 In establishing that the statute of limitations for
construction defects applied, the court reasoned:
The continuing nuisance or trespass theory allows for
deferral of the starting date of the statute of limitations in
much the same way as does the discovery rule. Neither
theory or rule may override the statute of repose created
by the Legislature's fixed starting point and outer limit
for latent construction defects. We apply the same two-
step process used in other real property construction de-
fect cases. 172
Moreover, in the case of City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum,173
the court reviewed whether products liability statutes of limi-
tations take precedence over continuing nuisance statutes of
limitations. In holding that products liability statutes of lim-
itations are supreme to such common limitations periods, the
court reasoned "[The] [clity cites no California decision, how-
ever, that allows recovery for a defective product under a nui-
sance cause of action. Indeed, under City's theory, nuisance
'would become a monster that would devour in one gulp the
entire law of tort .... "174
Both Chevron and U.S. Gypsum stand for the proposition
that if a statutory statute of limitations conflicts with a com-
mon law statute of limitations, the statutory period is
adopted. However, courts have extended this rule to apply to
substantive laws as well.
168. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 787-88 (Ct.
App. 1994); City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 880-82
(Ct. App. 1994).
169. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
170. Id. at 784.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 788.
173. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 880-81 (Ct. App. 1994).
174. Id. at 883, (quoting Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum, 984 F.2d 915,
921 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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In Feikema v. Texaco, Inc.,1 7 5 the Fourth Circuit held
that if state environmental nuisance and trespass claims con-
flict with a consent order issued under the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, then such state claims are
barred. 176 Thus, courts recognize that environmental nui-
sance and trespass cases should be pursued under a uniform
statutory scheme that outlines when a cause of action exists
and sets a uniform statute of limitations. Courts also under-
stand the injustice created by the Legislature's unwillingness
to mandate the classification of all environmental nuisance
and trespass claims. As the court acknowledged in Chevron,
when discussing the fact that the plaintiff, not the defendant,
was stuck with the cleanup costs:
DiSalvo's assertions of unfairness and violation of
public policy favoring accountability for pollution warrant
consideration, however. They point to inequities in the
statute of limitations and to potential unfairness in its ap-
plication. The result in Grange demonstrates the same
unfairness DiSalvo finds here. The party who may have
caused the contamination was exempted by the statute of
limitations, while a more innocent possessor of the prop-
erty at the time of the contamination (San Rafael in
Grange, DiSalvo here) might be held accountable for
clean-up costs.' 77
In short, courts appear to be pleading with the legisla-
tures to enact laws that eliminate nuisance and trespass in-
consistencies, so as to allow both plaintiffs and defendants
the ability to be adequately informed about how to pursue
claims that today are deemed environmental nuisances and
trespasses. Until such laws are passed, injustice will con-
tinue to plague all parties involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Allowing plaintiffs to use common law nuisance and tres-
pass theories in environmental cases was logical prior to 1970
because there were few environmental statutes in place that
provided the necessary remedies for plaintiffs. As a matter of
fact, a legitimate argument can be made on behalf of legisla-
175. 16 F.3d 1408 (4th Cir. 1994).
176. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416.
177. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 789 (Ct.
App. 1994).
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tures that there was little reason to require plaintiffs to file
under environmental statutes prior to the mid 1980's because
no one recognized the extent of the environmental problems
in this country.178 However, modern technology, used to as-
sess and detect environmental problems, is far more sophisti-
cated today than it was in 1970, or for that matter 1985.
We now know that environmental problems are much
more pervasive, and that clean-up operations are more com-
plicated than anyone ever suspected. To address these com-
plications, most environmental statutes passed in the 1970's
and 1980's have been significantly modified.' 79 In essence,
these statutes have sought to keep pace with the technologi-
cal advances that have occurred over that period. The use of
common law nuisance and trespass claims to address envi-
ronmental problems is an outdated method since much of the
caselaw relied upon precedes the enactment of many of the
environmental statutes. Consequently, the cases do not di-
rect the courts on how to confront the complicated problems
that are associated with pollution.
Until the legislative branch requires that environmental
nuisance and trespass claims be brought under one of the en-
vironmental statutes, the gap between technological ad-
vances and common law interpretation of what is considered
a continuing nuisance and trespass will continue to widen.
More importantly, the confusion created by the courts inter-
178. A perfect example of how the legislative branch did not recognize the
extent of the hazardous waste problem is Congress' initial passage of CERCLA.
Initially, CERCLA was only authorized for five years. See H.R. REP. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. pt. 2, at 11 (1980). Another example is the Clean Water
Act, where Congress thought that the nation's rivers would be cleaned up by
1985. See G. Nelson Smith, III, Lawmaker As Lawbreaker: Enforcement Ac-
tions Against Municipalities For Failing To Comply With The Clean Water Act,
41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 685 (1993).
179. CERCLA, initially passed in 1980, was reauthorized as the Superfund
Amendment of 1986. See H.R. REP. No. 253(111), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 19
(codified as amended to 18 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)). RCRA, initially passed
in 1976, was reauthorized in 1984 with the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments. See H.R. Rep. No. 14, 496, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 1 (1984). The Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 was amended as the Clean Water Act
of 1977 and the Water Quality Act of 1987. See Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, S. REP. No. 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1973); Clean Water Act, S.
REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1977); Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 36 (codified in scattered sections as amended 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387). The Clean Air Act of 1970 was amended in 1977 and
virtually overhauled and rewritten in 1990. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
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preting the meaning of nuisance and trespass in environmen-
tal cases will continue to plague both plaintiffs and defend-
ants in such cases.

